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Abstract
We study the relationships between national brand prices and the devel-
opment of private labels, using home-scanned data from a consumer survey
reporting purchases for 218 food products. In a significant number of cases
(144 out of 218), we observe a positive correlation (89%) between brand
price and purchases of private labels. When controlling for changes in the
products quality, we still find a positive relation between private label de-
velopment and national brand prices. Thus, the change in the national brand
product characteristics only partly explains the increase in the national brand
prices. Furthermore, the price reactions of national brands differ according
to the type of private labels they are facing. Finally, we demonstrate that
the development of private labels has less effect on the prices of second-tier
brands than prices of the leading brand.
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1 Introduction
Retailers play a key role in the food chain. For example, in France, they sell
about 75% of food products to final consumers (INSEE, 2004). Among other
decisions, they set consumer prices and determine the assortment of goods to be
sold. By developing private labels (PL), which are their own brands, retailers
now play an active role in the production of final goods.1 These products, which
now represent 10% to 40% of retail food sales in the different EU countries, are a
strategic tool used by retailers to increase profits.
Private labels provide additional market power to retailers. Thus, by devel-
oping their own products, retailer are less dependent on the upstream suppliers.
By lowering their dependency, retailers reinforce their bargaining position and can
thus extract more profits. By developing their own products, they also obtain more
information about upstream costs. This is another way of reinforcing bargaining
power since it is liable to reduce information rents. Private labels also modify
the competition among retailers. Because a private label is a specific product of a
given retailer, retailers use it as a differentiation tool, which thus potentially soft-
ens the price competition among them. Private labels also allow retailers to attract
customers and build up store loyalty.
However, the effect of private label development on prices remains an open
question. Theoretical models have mainly addressed this question in terms of a
vertical structure between producers and retailers. The impact of private label de-
velopment on national brand (NB) prices is different according to the method used
to model demand and the form of the contract.2 The conventional wisdom is that
PL entry induces a decrease in the NB prices. Moreover, empirical models provide
different answers. For example, Ward et al. (2002) found that private label devel-
opment has a positive impact on national brand prices. These authors obtained a
systematic relationship across a large number of food product categories. On the
other hand, Bonfrer and Chintagunta (2004) obtained some mixed results on the
changes of national brand prices following the introduction of private labels and
found a negative price impact in 46% of cases.
As a new product, the introduction of PL impacts consumer surplus. If NB
prices increase with PL entry, then their entry could negatively affects consumer
1According to the Private Label Manufacturers’ Association (PLMA), "[Private label] products
encompass all merchandise sold under a retailer’s brand. That brand can be the retailer’s own name
or a name created exclusively by that retailer. In some cases, a retailer may belong to a wholesale
group that owns the brands that are available only to the members of the group."
2For a recent review of this literature, see Berges et al.(2004).
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surplus. Hausman and Léonard (2002) pointed out that consumers surplus is af-
fected through two ways: a variety effect and a price effect. The classical result is
that an additional product increases competition and then decreases prices. How-
ever, the price decrease is not always verified. For example the introduction by
a multi-product firm of a new product may lead to an increase in the price of the
existing products as the firm takes into account the interaction between all prod-
ucts.3 If the introduction of private labels is accompanied by an increase in prices
of existing brands, the impact on consumers’ surplus (through prices) could be
negative or at least significantly reduced.
From a theoretical point of view, Gabrielsen and Sørgard (2007) showed that
under some circumstances the introduction of private labels decreases both con-
sumer and total welfare. In that case the price of existing products increases with
the entry of private labels.4 In the pharmaceutical industry, the entry of generic
product (when patent expires) causes similar phenomena. Research on the US
market showed that the introduction of a generic product frequently causes an in-
crease in the price of the incumbent product (e.g. Frank and Salkever, 1997). The
generic product attracts switching consumers while the incumbent product con-
centrates on the inelastic part of the demand which explains the price increase.
According to Frank and Salkever, the increase in price is not ‘sufficient’ to anni-
hilate the positive impact on consumer welfare of the entry of a generic product.
This increase in price is however not systematic as exemplified by the analysis of
Bergman and Rudholm (2003) on the pharmaceutical market in Sweden.
To sum up, there still exists some uncertainty on the PL price effect. If PL
development is accompanied by NB price increase, then the consumer surplus
could be negatively affected or at least the anticipated gain for consumers (of a
PL development) could be very low. This is an empirical question that needs to
be further investigated. The present study generalizes and extends the approach
developed by Bontemps et al. (2005). Firstly, theoretical models suggest that the
positioning of private labels is a key element in the strategy of a retailer (Scott-
Morton and Zettelmeyer, 2004, Bontems, 2005). It is now well established by
marketing studies that there are at least three types of private labels (‘low price’,
‘me-too’ and ‘high quality’). These different private labels are targeted to com-
pete with a specific class of products. In broad terms, the ‘low-price’ category
3With the new product, the marginal loss of revenues due to an increase in the price of existing
products is lowered as part of the lost demand is now attracted by the new product. The firm has
thus interest to increase the prices of existing products.
4Note however that under some circumstances the prices of existing brands increase as well as
consumer and total welfare.
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is a response of the major retailing chains to the development of hard discount
stores. Therefore, retailers use private labels preferentially for competition to at-
tract switcher consumers. The ‘me-too’ products are the private labels used by
retailers to compete with national brands. They are used primarily to obtain more
bargaining power in relation to the upstream producers. Finally, ‘high-quality’
products have been developed more recently by retailers in an attempt to build
reputation, rather corresponding to a way of attracting new consumers (and thus
dealing with competition among retailers). If these different categories of private
labels were developed for various purposes, then changes in the prices of national
brands due to the development of private labels should differ as a function of their
type.
Secondly, theoretical models suggest that national brand producers could re-
act to private labels development by a strategy of product differentiation and, in
particular, by modifying ‘quality’ (Mills, 1999; Bontems, 2005). If this were true,
then this would create a change in the price of national brands that reflects the
change in the product characteristics rather than the pricing strategy. We thus
need to separate the price effect for a given set of characteristics from the price
change due to modifications in the characteristics.
Thirdly, recent studies have suggested that the different national brands could
be differently affected by the entry of private labels. For example Scott-Morton
and Zettelmeyer (2004) showed that, in a context of limited shelf space, a retailer
introducing a private label will position it close to the leading brand. Moreover,
they pointed out that the retailer will no longer sell the second-tier national brand.
Sayman, Hoch and Raju (2002) also showed that the retailer should target the
leading brand when introducing a private label. Both studies found some empiri-
cal evidence supporting their theoretical analysis. However, they also found cases
in which private labels were not targeted towards the leading national brand. Du,
Lee and Staelin (2006) developed a theoretical model that included three products
(two national brands and one private label). They showed that, in many situa-
tions, it might be more profitable for the retailer to locate the private label close
to the second national brand. Thus, we investigate here whether the prices of the
different national brands are differently affected by private label development.
Our paper is thus one step to better understand the price effect of PL intro-
duction taking into account both the heterogeneity of PL and the heterogeneity of
NB. If NB prices increase with the introduction of PL it could be the case that
consumer surplus is negatively affected by the development of PL. To address
4
these issues, we use home-scanned data from a panel of consumers and study the
links between prices of national brands and the development of private labels. In
Section 2, we briefly summarize the main findings of the recent literature. Then,
Section 3 presents the model used to estimate the links between private labels
development and national brand prices in France. The data used are reported in
Section 4. Section 5 presents the empirical models that are estimated. We discuss
the results in Section 6 and give our conclusions in Section 7.
2 An overview of recent empirical studies on the im-
pact of private labels development
Recent empirical studies have investigated the impact of private label development
on prices. Ward et al. (2002) studied the impact of the development of private
labels in the US. These authors used monthly data on prices, market share and
advertising expenses for 32 product categories. For each category, they analysed
how national brands react to the development of private labels. They showed that
an increase in the private label market share is consistent with:
• An increase (or no change) in the price of national brands .
• A decrease (or no change) in the price of private labels.
• A decrease or no change of average prices.
• A decrease in advertising activity for national brands.
Using the same methodology, Bontemps et al. (2005), using French data on
6 dairy products, showed that an increase in the private label market share is con-
sistent with an increase in the price of national brands. Gabrielsen et al. (2002)
investigated the impact of the introduction of private labels in Norway for 83 prod-
ucts. For each product, these authors studied changes in national brand prices over
time and distinguished the period before the entry of private labels from the pe-
riod after entry. When the impact of private labels introduction is significant (17
cases out of 83 products) there is a positive correlation (15 cases). The introduc-
tion of private labels produces an increase in national brand prices. This is in line
with the idea that, after the entry of a private label, the national brand focuses on
‘brand addict’ consumers, while the PL is targeted towards ‘switcher’ consumers
(Gabrielsen and Sørgard, 2007). Moreover, their results suggest that the increase
in national brand prices is larger for leading and nationally distributed brands.
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These three studies concluded that private label development has a positive
impact on national brand prices. However, Chintagunta, Bonfrer and Song (2002),
using data on sales from different stores of a large supermarket chain, studied the
impact of the introduction of private labels in the breakfast cereal market. They
showed that private label introduction leads to a decrease in the price of the leading
national brand, a decrease in the promotional activities of the national brand and
no change in the profit margin of the retailer on the national brand. Bonfrer and
Chintagunta (2004) analysed the impact of PL entry in 35 product categories. In
about half of the cases surveyed (19 out of 35 cases), their study found that the
entry of private labels leads to an increase in national brand prices. However, in
the remaining cases, it leads to a price decrease.5
As explained previously, the entry of generic products in the pharmaceutical
sector also leads to mixed empirical results. While Frank and Salkever (1997)
provided evidence that the entry of generic products was accompanied by an in-
crease in NB prices, Bergman and Rudholm (2003) found the opposite result in
the case of the Swedish pharmaceutical market.
These studies mainly evaluated the effect of private labels development on
national brand prices, considering private labels as one homogeneous group and
national brands as another. However, as discussed in the introduction, the different
types of private labels might compete in a different way with national brands.
Similarly, the different national brands might be differently affected depending on
the exact positioning of the private labels. Thus, a more detailed analysis of the
impact of private label development on prices is needed. Ward et al. (2002) tested
for different changes in the prices of the different national brands. They failed
to find any strong evidence that the prices of the different national brands were
affected in different ways. On the contrary, they concluded that, whether or not the
NB is leader, the price effect is identical. Bontemps et al. (2005), demonstrated
that the national brand prices vary according to the type of private labels they
are facing. These authors also proposed that the price increase in national brand
products could be partly explained by a strategy of product differentiation. Finally,
Pauwels and Srinivasan (2004) showed there can be differences between the price
changes of leading national brands and second-tier brands. They found an increase
in the price of leading brands while, in some cases, they recorded a decrease in
the price of second-tier brands after the entry of a private label.
5Bonfrer and Chintagunta (2004) also studied the impact of the entry of a competing national
brand. They obtained a similar result, observing an increase in the price of incumbent national
brands in 34 cases out of 65.
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3 Model
In the literature, two main classes of models were estimated depending on the
available data: consumer panels (home-scanned data) and retailer panels (e.g.
scanner data). In the latter case, information on prices and sales is recorded for
different stores. Then, researchers can observe and monitor the entry of a given
private label as well as record the evolution of prices. When using such data,
researchers commonly evaluate the price effect of entry by using dummy vari-
ables that indicate whether or not a private label is present (e.g. Gabrielsen et al.
(2002)). The coefficient of the dummy variable provides information about the
price effect. The specified models can be expressed as follows:
ln(Pt) = α+β ′Xt + γ I[t>PL date entry ] + εt
where Pt is the NB price at time t, Xt are various variables describing the market,
including or not PL market shares.
On the contrary, with consumer panel data, researchers do not have precise
information on prices in a given store. The price of a particular product in a given
store is known only when at least one consumer of the panel has actually bought
this product at that store. Thus, contrary to the previous case, it is now impossible
to determine the behaviour of prices in a given store after the entry of a PL.
Moreover, with such a database, one cannot determine precisely when a new
private label is introduced into a given store. The situation is comparable to a
"continuous entry" of PL over time where it is only possible to observe the evolu-
tion of the PL market share. Thus, researchers generally analyse the price effects
of PL development using a reduced form regressing the prices of national brands
on various variables (e;g. Ward et al. (2002)). The model specified in this case
can be formulated as follows:
ln(Pt) = f (Xt)+ εt
As we have access to consumer panel data we follow the second strategy de-
scribed above. Because there is no single clear picture of the impact of private
labels development on national brand prices, we test different models in a re-
duced form. We investigate the effects of the development of different types of
private labels on the average price of national brands and the price of main na-
tional brands. We propose a general reduced-form specification for each product
category k ∈ {1, · · · ,K}:
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lnPik = β0+
J∑
j=1
βk, j · lnMS jk+
3∑
q=1
αq ·dq+ ε ik (1)
where Pik represents the monthly sequence of prices P
i
k = (P
i
k,0, · · · ,Pik,T ) of the
ith national brand price for the product category k, MSjk = (MS
j
k,0, · · · ,MSjk,T ) is
the sequence of market shares for the jth private label ( j ∈ 1, · · · ,J) for the product
category k, and dq are the quarterly dummies, β0 a constant parameter, and ε ik the
error term.
The price of a product k may change because its characteristics vary over time.
It is a classical problem national statisticians face when computing price indexes.
To deal with this issue, we define a segmentation of each product category in
subcategories and compute the Paasche price index using volume of each subcat-
egory at time t=0. The assumption is that the characteristics of each subcategory
is constant over time while the aggregate characteristics of the product category
is not, as the share of each subcategory may change over time. The Paasche price
index controls this effect. Thus, in equation 1, the Paasche price index (defined
using a segmentation of each product category k, into Sk sub-categories) is used
as the alternative dependent variable. Formally, the Paasche price index sequence
˜Pik = (˜P
i
k,0, · · · , ˜Pik,T ) is defined as:
˜Pik,t =
∑Sks=1 Pis,t ·Volis,0
∑Sks=1Volis,0
(2)
In Section 5, we specify precisely the seven different models that are esti-
mated.
4 Data and descriptive statistics
We used data from the TNS-SECODIP Consumer Panel, providing information
on household purchases on 218 product categories over four years (1998-2001)
in France.6 A more in depth analysis is proposed on a subset of 20 product cat-
egories. We defined T = 52 periods of 4 weeks over the whole period. For each
6TNS-Secodip (Société d’Etudes de la Consommation, de la Distribution et de la Publicité)
collects weekly data on purchases in more than 8,000 French households.
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product category k, we constructed a monthly time series of prices and market
shares for the different types of brands. They are defined as follows:
• The price of the NB brand i at period t, Pik,t , is defined as the ratio between
the sales and the volume of purchases of brand i during the given period. It
is deflated using the consumer price index or, when feasible, using a sector
specific price index.7
• The Paasche price index is computed according to equation 2 on the basis
of a case-by-case segmentation of each product category k into Sk subcate-
gories.
• The market share of brand j for product k at period t, MSjk,t , is the ratio
of the volume of brand j purchased during the period to the volume of all
brands purchased in the same period. We define five main types of brands.
The first two are traditionally considered as private labels, the third corre-
sponds to low-price products, while the last two are producer brands. They
are sequentially defined as follows:
HD : Hard Discount products are sold exclusively by hard discounter stores8.
PL : Private Labels (sensu stricto) are developed exclusively by retailers.
Within this category we distinguish three subtypes i.e. :9
* PLlow : Low-price Private Labels are private labels sold at very
low prices,
* PLstand : Standard Private Labels. In particular, ‘me-too’ prod-
ucts belong to this category,
* PLprem : Premium Private Labels are private labels of ’high qual-
ity’.
FP : First Price products are brands sold at low prices. We define them as
brands that are neither HD nor PL, and whose price is lower than or
equal to the price of HD products. They are generally considered as
7 For some products for which the value of the agricultural raw material is a significant part
of the final value (e.g. fluid milk, cream) we use a production price index instead of the general
consumers price index.
8A discount store is a "low cost" retail store, which sell mostly food products at low prices.
The store proposes less choices and almost no national brands. The items are generally proposed
in rough boxes instead of shelves.
9We define these subtypes of PL using information on PL names and prices in each retail chain.
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the response of supermarkets and hypermarkets to the development of
hard discounters. However they are not private labels since they are
producer brands that are not specific to a particular retailer.
–The remaining brands are producers brand. We distinguish :
* NB : National Brand products that are sold in more than 50% of
French regions. For each product category, we also define the first
three leading brands, NB1, NB2 and NB3, based on market share
by volume.
* RB : Regional Brand products are other brands sold in less than
50% of French regions.
In the following, we present some descriptive statistics for the 20 product cate-
gories which are more systematically analysed in this study. On Figure 1, national
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Figure 1: National Brands Market Share vs Relative Price
brand market shares are plotted against relative prices, defined as PNB/PPL. We
note a significant (p-value = 0.006) and positive correlation between the national
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brand market share and the relative price.10 Although this relationship appears
counter-intuitive, it is consistent with the analysis developed by Mills (1995) that
takes into account the differentiation between national brands and private labels.
As explained by Mills (1995, p.523) of his article, “In a cross section of product
categories where retailers sell both national brands and private labels, the pri-
vate labels’ share of category unit sales (...) vary inversely with Δp (difference in
national brand and private label prices) .11 Thus, when the national brand market
share is low, this means that the consumer does not perceive quality differences
between national brands and private label products. Hence, the price competi-
tion is ’tough’. Then, even if the price difference between NB and PL products is
relatively small, the NB market share is small too due to the lack of product dif-
ferentiation. On the contrary, if the national brand is perceived to be of significant
higher quality, then a ‘large’ difference in price is compatible with a large market
share for national brands.12
Table 1 presents some statistics for private labels (PL+HD) and national brands
for the 20 product categories. Within each category, the national brand product
price is higher than the average price (set at the index 100). Conversely, the private
label price is lower than the average price in most cases. The market shares of
national brand products vary greatly across categories (from 18 % for Emmental
cheese up to around 80% for colas and fresh cheese). Private label market shares
are less variable and rarely reach 50% (ranging from 14.3% for fresh cheese to
61.% for fruit juice).
The change of market share over time (ρ in Table 1) reveals a significant de-
velopment of private labels over the period. For almost all the product categories,
the trend coefficient of private labels (PL+HD) market share is significant and
positive.13 The average growth of private label market share is greater than 1
per period on several markets, even reaching 3 for some products.14
10We obtain a similar result using the whole set of product categories (218).
11In Figure 1, we report the NB market share, and not the PL market share as in Mills (1995),
thus explaining the positive correlation obtained here.
12We obtain a similar result using all the product categories.
13This result is confirmed by an exhaustive analysis of 218 products showing that, out of 156
cases with significant trend coefficients for the private labels market share, 134 (86%) exhibit a
positive sign.
14A 1 increase per period is equivalent to 1.3% increase per year (13 periods of 4 weeks per
year). A 3 increase per period is equivalent to a 4.0% increase per year.
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Conversely, the national brand market share decreases in most cases and it
increases in only two product categories (margarine and cream).
With respect to prices, we define the ratio ρ/ν as a trend coefficient approx-
imating the rate of growth of the price per-period evaluated for the first period.15
It is noteworthy that the trend coefficient of national brand prices is significant
and positive for all product categories but one. Thus, national brand prices usually
increase by more than 1 up to 4 per period of 4 weeks (that is 1.3 to 5.3%
per year).16 Using the Paasche price index instead of the price reveals the same
pattern here, trends being positive for all products.
For some products (drinking milk, cottage cheese, fruit juice), the Paasche
price index increases at a much lower rate than the observed price. It means that
part of the increase in observed price is due to a change in the ’composition’ of
the product (the relative share of ’high quality’ subcategories increased over time).
However, for some other products there is no difference. For margarine, it is the
opposite which would imply that NB products are more present in ’low quality’
subcategories at the end of the period.
5 Empirical models
In table 2, we present the 7 different models that are estimated in this paper. All
models are derived from the general model defined in Equation (1). We consider
various sets of private labels as explanatory variables, combined with decomposed
or aggregated definition of National Brands. In the following, we use the tilde su-
perscript to denote models where the price on the left hand side is replaced by the
Paasche price index of the price :
Model M1 is similar to the model estimated by Ward et al (2002) and is es-
timated for all products available (218). We establish this simple model in order
to compare our results with their results obtained on the US market. Model ˜M1 is
similar to model M1 except that the left hand side of the model is a Paasche price
index controlling for changes in the price of national brands due to a change in the
pool of goods that make up a product category. It is estimated on a reduced set of
products categories (20) for which a segmentation has been performed. Models
M2 and ˜M2 are developed to test whether or not different brands (Private Labels
15That is the ratio between the coefficient of the linear trend and the value of the constant.
16This result is also confirmed on the 218 product categories, since 87% of the significant trend
coefficients are positive.
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Table 2: Empirical models estimated
Models Dependent Set of Private labels Number of products
variable examined
M1: lnPNBk j ∈ {PL+HD} N = 218
˜M1: ln˜PNBk j ∈ {PL+HD} N = 20
M2: lnPNBk j ∈ {PL,HD,FP} N = 218
˜M2: ln˜PNBk j ∈ {PL,HD,FP} N = 20
˜M3: ln˜PNBk j ∈ {PLlow,PLstand ,PLprem,HD,FP} N = 14
ln˜PNB1k
˜M4: ln˜PNB2k j ∈ {PL,HD,FP} N = 20
ln˜PNB3k
ln˜PNB1k
˜M5: ln˜PNB2k j ∈ {PLlow,PLstand ,PLprem,HD,FP} N = 14
ln˜PNB3k
sensu stricto, Hard Discount products and First Price brands), have a different
effect. In Model ˜M3 (and ˜M5), we further analyse the role of private labels by
distinguishing three types of private labels. Because the definition of these three
types of private labels is based on the analysis of their prices within a particular
retailer, we restrict our analysis to the three largest retailers.17 Finally, in Models
˜M4 and ˜M5, we analyse if the prices of the different national brands are differently
affected by the development of private labels.
Since market shares may be endogeneous, we perform the estimation of all the
empirical models with respect to this problem. Here, potential endogeneity is in
principle mainly related to the demand. We thus selected exogeneous instruments
17The three largest retailers in France represent more than 40% of total sales. We worked on 14
products rather than 20 because, in some cases, at least one of the retailers doesn’t have all types
of private label.
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with explanatory power on the market shares: the lagged PL market share for
each type of private label for the current product category, the private label market
share for other products, as well as other characteristics of the market (number
of producers, number of brands, market size relative to other products, market
concentration, etc.). These instruments should explain time and cross-sectional
patterns of market shares of private label in one category driven by factors that
drive general average "growth" in private label in other categories. Thus, the in-
strumental variables estimation performed is netting out what could have been
due to endogenous determinants of private labels market shares.18 So, for each
product category, we first test for relevance and validity of the instruments using
the Sargan overidentification test.19 Then, using Hausman’s test, we test for en-
dogeneity and apply instrumental variables estimation if needed.
For each empirical model, we also test for autocorrelation and heteroskedas-
ticity that may have arisen from the computation of average prices and market
shares on each period and correct the estimation according to the results of the
tests.20
6 Results
Question 1 : Do the National Brands prices rise with the development of Private
Labels ?
From Model M1, we conclude that the development of private labels coincides
with a significant increase in national brand prices (Table 3). This result is in line
with the findings of Ward et al. (2002), even though our study covers a larger
number of product categories and was carried out in a different country.
National brand producers may react to private label development either by
using a product differentiation strategy, or by developing new products. In that
case, the ‘average quality’ of national brands might increase over time because
producers focus on ‘high quality’ products. Such a change in quality might also
18Endogeneity may also arise from (unobserved) costs. The instruments used here may also be
valid with this source of endogeneity (e.g. private labels market shares for other products).
19We use Stata’s IVREG2 procedure and test the relevance of the instruments by checking their
significance on the first-stage regression.
20 We use the White and Breush-Pagan heteroskedasticity tests and the Breusch-Godfrey test
for higher-order serial correlation in the error distribution.
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Table 3: Number of positive β in Model M1 on the 218 product categories
Significant Positive
Model M1 βPL+HD 116 103 (89%)
Detailed results on the 20 products categories are gathered in Table A-1
explain the increase in NB average price observed in Table 1. This leads us to ask:
Question 2: When quality effects are taken into account, do the National
Brands prices still rise with Private Labels development?
As explained above, to control for quality changes, we used a Paasche price
index instead of the average price. Doing that we control for changes in the av-
erage price of a product category that results from a change in the share of the
different subcategories of this product category. We use the Paasche price index
for NB prices as dependent variable in Model ˜M1.
The coefficients for model ˜M1 are all significant and positive in 18 cases over
20 (Table A-1).21 This means that the policy of NB producers to focus more on
specific subcategories (which is frequently the case) does not fully explain the
increase in the price of NBs. Thus, it is likely that quality changes are not enough
to explain the increase in NB prices.
Previous empirical studies did not consider the differences between Private
Labels and Hard Discount brands. However, the price effects of the development
of private labels and hard discount products may not be identical. Indeed, these
two brands are developed by retailers for different purposes. Moreover, in the case
of competition between PL and NB, the same retailer sets both prices, while HD
retailer only sets the price of HD products (as this retailer does not sell NB).
Question 3: Are there differences between the price effects of Private Label,
Hard Discount and First Price products ?
Our results show that the development of the different types of retailer brands
has significant price effect. We find more frequently a significant value for private
21They are negative for butter and margarine which are the only products experiencing a de-
crease in the market shares of PL (see Table 1).
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Table 4: Number of positive β values in Model M2 on 218 product categories
Significant Positive
βPL 108 99 (91%)
Model M2 βHD 89 79 (89%)
βFP 73 57 (78%)
See Table A-1 for the results, on Models M2 and ˜M2, on the 20 product categories
labels than First price products. Moreover, when significant the impact of the three
types of retailer brands is positive (Table 4). The ranking of the effects shows that
when significant, as observed in 2/3 of the cases, Private Labels (sensu stricto)
have the largest impact (Table 5).22
Table 5: Comparison of the β values obtained with Model M2
βHD ≤ βPL
False True N. S.
False 11 2 5
βFP ≤ βPL True 5 96 5
N.S. 15 5 0
144
Test for 144 products having at least one significant β in Model M2
Details of the test for the 20 product categories are in Table A-1
To summarize, we obtain the following inequalities:
βHD ≤ βPL
βFP ≤ βPL
Thus, the elasticity of NB prices with respect to market share of PL is always
greater than (or at least equal to) the elasticity with respect to HD or FP. However,
it is not possible to systematically rank the respective elasticity with respect to HD
22We use the Wald test of equality between β ’s in Models M2.
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and FP. Note that, when quality changes are taken into account (model ˜M2), the
above inequalities still hold (Table A-1).
The models tested so far yield robust results with respect to the sign of the β
coefficient as well as their ranking, whatever the products. However, the β val-
ues differ from one category to another. We thus attempted to find some market
characteristics that could explain the differences in the β values between product
categories.
Question 4: Do the effects differ between products?
To answer this question, we first perform a cluster analysis of the product cat-
egory in order to distinguish groups of products. Then we test the equality of the
β between clusters. To perform the cluster analysis of the product categories we
used variables describing the market structure for each product as well as con-
sumers’ behaviour (Table A-2). The clustering exhibits two groups of products.23
Cluster 1 includes 73 product categories for which the market is concentrated and
experiencing a smaller private-label market share. Cluster 2 includes 71 products
characterized by a lower concentration, a larger number of private labels, more
brands and varieties of products .
Table 6: Equality tests and statistics on the β ’s in each cluster
Cluster 1 Cluster 2
Mean (s. e.) Mean (s. e.) Equality Test
Model M1 βPL+HD .077 (.0126) .174 (.0289) rejected
βPL .078 (.0115) .189 (.0284) rejected
Model M2 βHD .042 (.0069) .072 (.0156) accepted
βFP .050 (.0170) .042 (.0133) accepted
The equality test performs t-test on the equality of means between the 2 clusters. The result of the tests are given at a 95% confidence level.
The equality tests of β between the two clusters show there are differences
23We use the Calinski and Harabasz index for the choice of the number of Clusters.
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between βPL+HD in Model M1 and βPL in Model M2 (Table 6).When the mar-
ket is less concentrated (cluster 2), the value of βPL (or βPL+HD) is larger. Thus,
frequently-bought products with a large number of varieties, which have a high
market share for private labels, are products associated with PL development
along with a larger increase in national brand prices.
Question 5 : Do all private labels have the same effects?
As explained in the introduction, there exist at least three categories of private
labels. All of them undergo a significant increase over time in their market share.
Results show that the ‘standard’ private labels (PLstand) and the ‘low-priced’ pri-
vate labels (PLlow) have a significant and positive impact on NB prices (Table
A-3). On the contrary, we did not find any significant effect due to premium
private labels (PLprem). These results also suggest that the market shares of ‘low-
priced’ and ‘premium’ private labels are less correlated with NB prices than stan-
dard PL (i.e. βPLstand ≥ βPLprem and βPLstand ≥ βPLlow). This supports the hypothesis
that these two categories of PLs are used to attract new consumers or build the rep-
utation of retailers, and are less used as a strategic tool to compete with national
brands. Conversely, the standard PL is more directly used as a tool to compete
with NBs and thus its market share exhibits a stronger correlation with NB prices.
Till now, we have analysed the behaviour of the average price of national
brands when private labels are developed. As suggested by theoretical studies
(Scott-Morton and Zettelmeyer (2004); Du, Lee and Staelin (2006)), the different
national brands might be differently affected .24
Question 6 : Are each of the three leading national brands affected identi-
cally?
Professionals frequently argue that, with private labels development, second-
tier national brands suffer more than leading brands. In this view, shelf space is
scarce. Thus, when a retailer introduces a private label into a store, this leads to the
removal of a national brand. The retailer may remove the NB2 or NB3 rather than
the NB1 (exactly as shown by Scott-Morton and Zettelmeyer, (2002)). However, a
descriptive analysis (Table A-4) does not support this view. Thus, statistical tests
24Ward et al. (2002) investigated this question, but failed to find any significant differences
between the brands.
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Table 7: Inequalities between β coefficients
βPL ≥ βHD and βPL ≥ βFP
Model ˜M2 All NB 17 cases out of 20
NB1 16 cases out of 20
Model ˜M4 NB2 17 cases out of 20
NB3 15 cases out of 20
See Table A-5 for details. The results of the Wald tests are given at a 95% confidence level.
yield no evidence that NB2 or NB3 experience a larger decrease in market share
than NB1. Rather, we find that NB1 experiences a larger decrease in market share
than NB3.
To test if the leading NBs are differently affected by private label develop-
ment, we developed the same models as before on each of three leading National
Brands. First, we find that the results obtained for the aggregation of NB (i.e. β s
positive when significant and βHD ≤ βPL and βFP ≤ βPL) still hold for each of
the three leading national brands (see results of model ˜M4 in Table 7).25
Second, we estimated the price reaction of each leading NB to the develop-
ment of each PLs. We find that the results obtained for the aggregation of NB (i.e.
βPLstand ≥ βPLprem and βPLstand ≥ βPLlow) still hold for NB1, NB2 and in a lower
extent for NB3 (Table 8).
Finally, we tested the magnitude of the coefficients within the three leading
national brands. In most of the cases, we obtain βPLNB1 ≥ βPLNB3 (Table 9). Thus,
NB1 and NB3 prices behave differently. A possible explanation would be related to
the strategic pricing of products by a retailer. If a private label is targeted against
NB1, a retailer might find it profitable to increase the price of NB1 (in order to
discriminate among consumers) by a larger amount than the prices of NB2 and
NB3.
25Note that the βFP are less frequently significant and even sometimes negative.
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Table 8: Wald Test results of the equality of βPLstand , βPLlow and βPLprem for all
brands (Model ˜M3) and each of the three leading brands (Model ˜M5)
Null hypothesis (H0) ˜M3 ˜M5
All NBs NB1 NB2 NB3
βPLstand ≥ βPLprem 14 13 14 11βPLstand ≥ βPLlow 14 13 13 14βPLlow ≥ βPLprem 14 13 14 11
See Table A-3 for estimations on Model ˜M3.
The results of the Wald tests are given at a 95% confidence level.
Table 9: Comparison of βPL in the three leading brands
Null hypothesis (H0) True
Model ˜M4 βPLNB1 ≥ βPLNB3 15βPLNB1 ≥ βPLNB2 14
Test results for NB2 vs NB3 and on FP are not conclusive and thus not reported,
Wald tests performed on a SUR model on ˜M4 (See Table A-5 for the results on Model ˜M4).
7 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we analyse the relationships between NB prices and PL market
shares on a large number of products. To achieve this objective, we specify various
models in a reduced form. The results obtained in this empirical analysis are
remarkably robust. We detected a significant and positive correlation between
private labels development and the prices of national brands. This confirms the
results of Ward et al (2002) based on US data, and extend the study developed by
Bontemps et al (2005). When taking the quality effect into account, we still find
a positive relation between private label development and national brand prices.
Thus, the change in the NB product characteristics is not the only reason for the
increase in the NB prices.
Moreover, our results corroborate the additional hypotheses developed in this
paper. Firstly, the impacts of the different brands (Private Labels sensu stricto,
21
Hard Discount products and First Price brands) are not identical. Even if we found
positive effects for each of the three brands, the increase in the national brand
prices with the development of hard discount products or first-price products is
lower than with the development of Private Labels.
Secondly, by carrying out a more detailed analysis within the private labels,
we can show there is a different amplitude of the impact on prices. The standard
private labels, which can be considered as ‘me-too’ products, have the strongest
impact on national brand prices, while low-price private labels have a lower im-
pact. The development of premium PL does not exhibit significant impact on NB
prices. These results are consistent with the idea that standard PL were developed
by retailers to compete directly with NB products.
Finally, our results suggest that the leading national brand prices are affected
in different ways by private label development. Indeed, the development of Private
Labels (sensu stricto) has less effect on the prices of second-tier brands than on
the prices of the leading brand. A result that differs from Ward et al. (2002) who
did not found any differences among NBs.
It should be understood that in this analysis we cannot elucidate if the increase
in the retail price of NB is due to an increase of the wholesale price or is due
to the strategy of retailers who choose both the assortment and prices (or both).
Retailers when introducing or developing a private label may find some interest to
increase the NB prices in order to discriminate among consumers.
Overall, our results provide some support to the analysis developed by Gabrielsen
and Sørgard (2007) who showed that under some circumstances private labels de-
velopment may induce an increase in NB prices. These results also suggest that
the development of PL may have some negative impact on consumers surplus. At
least the surplus of some consumers might be negatively affected.
The reduced-form modeling adopted here allows us to handle a large num-
ber of products and models. Nevertheless, the disadvantage of this approach is
that it cannot provide in-depth explanations of the mechanisms involved. An al-
ternative approach would be to develop structural models for testing the strategic
behaviour of retailers. However, this would only be feasible on a reduced number
of products.
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Table A-2: Variables describing the two clusters of products (Clustering analysis)
Variables Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Equality Test
mean mean (p-value)
Market concentration (Herfindahl Index) 1870 900 > (0.0000)
Number of NB 7.16 19.65 < (0.0000)
Number of HD 4.38 8.14 < (0.0000)
Relative PL price ( PricePLMarket Price) 97.42 92.53 = (0.2686)
Relative HD price ( PriceHDMarket Price) 69.31 68.24 = (0.6266)
Market share of HD (%) 7.25 8.34 = (0.1245)
Market share of FP (%) 8.56 7.55 = (0.5402)
Trends in NB market shares (ρ in) -0.875 -0.879 = (0.9890)
NB Relative PL price (PriceNBPricePL ) 1.32 1.39 = (0.1674)
Coefficient of variation of the average price 5.52 4.12 > (0.0056)
Loyalty to NB (share of NBs) 0.56 0.46 > (0.0018)
Variables not included in the PCA∗
Market Share of PL (%) 17.52 27.79 < (0.0000)
Market Share of NB (%) 60.34 50.97 > (0.0034)
Number of brands 38.05 71.01 < (0.0000)
Number of PL 11.97 22.66 < (0.0000)
Number of producers 27.31 45.75 < (0.0000)
Number of varieties 99.34 154.55 < (0.0326)
Number of products 73 71
∗ Due to the correlation with other variables.
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